Email Gateway (Aug 22 2022 at 09:45): Email Gateway (Aug 22 2022 at 09:45):From: Tobias Nipkow <nipkow@in.tum.de>
VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and
Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey
auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from
which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We
formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove
that the functions for the allocation and the price determination are
well-defined. Furthermore we show that the allocation function
allocates goods only to participants, only goods in the auction are
allocated, and no good is allocated twice. We also show that the price
function is non-negative. These properties also hold for the
automatically extracted Scala code.
http://afp.sourceforge.net/entries/Vickrey_Clarke_Groves.shtml
Thanks to the authors, and stay tuned, because there is more where this first
nugget of auction theory came from!
smime.p7s
Last updated: Apr 26 2024 at 16:20 UTC